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INTRODUCTION
Public concern over the role money plays in the American elec-
toral process and political system is not a recent phenomenon.' For
more than a century, prominent Americans have been calling for re-
forms aimed at containing the influence of money in politics. 2 Con-
gress responded by gradually expanding, in piecemeal fashion, gov-
ernment regulation of methods used to finance campaigns for
national office.3 Finally, in 1971, Congress passed comprehensive
campaign finance reform. By enacting the Federal Election Cam-
paign Act ("FECA") 4 Congress sought to prevent actual and per-
ceived corruption and to reduce the costs of campaigns so that the
size of a candidate's "war chest" did not necessarily determine the
outcome of an election.5
1. See HERBERT E. ALEXANDER, FINANCING POLITICS: MONEY, ELECTIONS, & POLITICAL
REFoRM 23 (4th ed. 1992) (tracing public concern over influence of money in politics back to
1873 University of Wisconsin speech by Chief Justice Edward G. Ryan of Wisconsin Supreme
Court).
2. See id. at 24-28. Through the years, political leaders of both major political parties have
expressed the need to reform the manner in which campaigns for national office are financed
including former Presidents Chester A. Arthur, Harry S. Truman, Dwight D. Eisenhower, John
F. Kennedy, and Lyndon B. Johnson, and former Members of Congress William E. Chandler,
Russell Long, Charles Goodell, and Robert Ashmore. See id.
3. See id. at 24-29 (describing early efforts at campaign finance reform prior to enactment
of Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971). Congress passed the Civil Service Reform Act in
1883, which prohibited candidates from soliciting campaign contributions from employees of
the federal government. See id. at 24. In 1907, Congress banned corporate contributions with
the Tillman Act, 34 Stat. 864 (1907). See id. In 1910, Congress passed the Publicity Act, the first
campaign disclosure law. See Publicity Act of 1910, Pub. L. No. 61-274, 36 Stat. 822. Individuals
were prohibited from contributing more than $5000 per year to a federal candidate (or to that
candidate's campaign committee) beginning in 1940 with the passage of the Corrupt Practices
Act. See Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925. The Taft-Hartley Act later banned contribu-
tions from labor unions. SeeTaft-Hartiey Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136.
4. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225,86 Stat. 3.
5. See Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Federal Elections Comm'n, 116 S.
Ct. 2309, 2312 (1996) ("[FECA] sought both to remedy the appearance of a 'corrupt' political
process (one in which large contributions seem to buy legislative votes) and to level the elec-
toral playing field by reducing campaign costs." (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25-27
(1976))); S. REP. No. 93-689, at 2 (1974):
[FECA] was predicated upon the principle of public disclosure, that timely and com-
plete disclosure of receipts and expenditures would result in the exercise of prudence
PARTY EXPENDITURE PROVISION
Three years later, following the campaign abuses uncovered dur-
ing the Watergate scandal, Congress amended FECA (the "1974
Amendments") .' The 1974 Amendments attempted to restore public
confidence in the manner that campaigns for national office were fi-
nanced by strengthening FECA's disclosure, contribution, and ex-
penditure provisions.7 In particular, the 1974 Amendments limited
the amounts that federal candidates and their supporters could
spend on behalf of federal candidates' campaigns ("expenditure lim-
its") .8
Shortly after passage of the 1974 Amendments, various federal
candidates and potential supporters of federal candidates brought
suit claiming, inter alia, that FECA's contribution and expenditure
limits violated their First Amendment rights to express their views in
the political arena. With regard to FECA's contribution limits, the
Supreme Court, in Buckley v. Valeo,9 found that the government's in-
terest in preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption suf-
ficiently outweighed the interests of potential contributors in making
sizeable campaign contributions.'0 With respect to FECA's expendi-
ture limits, however, the Court found that the interests of federal
candidates and their supporters in promoting their views in the pub-
lic arena outweighed the government's interest in preventing actual
or perceived corruption," particularly when those expenditures were
by candidates and their committees and that excessive expenditures would incur the
displeasure of the electorate who would or could demonstrate indignation at the
polls.
see also S. REP. No. 92-96, at 20 (1972) ("[FECA] attempts to halt the spiraling cost of cam-
paigning for public office.").
6. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat.
1263.
7. See ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 29-30 (explaining impact of Watergate and describing
provisions of 1974 Amendments).
8. The 1974 Amendments prohibited persons from making expenditures in excess of
$1000 "relative to a clearly identified candidate during a calendar year." See 18 U.S.C.
§ 608(e) (1) (1976) (repealed). Similar expenditure limitations applied to spending by candi-
dates, see id. § 608(a), their campaigns, see id. § 608(c), and political parties in connection
with election campaigns, see id. § 608(0.
9. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
10. See id. at 20 ("[A] limitation upon the amount that any one person or group may con-
tribute to a candidate or political committee entails only a marginal restriction upon the con-
tributor's ability to engage in free communication."). The Court held that the interests of the
government in preventing actual or perceived corruption are sufficient to outweigh "the lim-
ited effect upon First Amendment freedoms" caused by FECA's contribution limits. See id. at
29.
11. See id. at 19, 47-48 (finding that "[t]he expenditure limitations contained in [FECA]
represent substantial rather than merely theoretical restraints on the quantity and diversity of
political speech" and that "the independent expenditure ceiling.., fails to serve any substan-
tial governmental interest in stemming the reality or appearance of corruption in the electoral
process").
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made independently ("independent expenditures"),12 without the
prior knowledge or consent of the candidates. 3 Recognizing the im-
portance of costly media advertising to advancing one's political
ideas, 14 the Court held that FECA's expenditure limits violated the
First Amendment.
5
As presently constituted, FECA prohibits persons,' 6 political action
committees ("PACs") 17 multi-candidate political action committees
("multi-PACs"), 8 and political parties'
9 from making contributions2
12. Under FECA, the term "independent expenditure" is defined as
an expenditure by a person expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly
identified candidate which is made without cooperation or consultation with any can-
didate, or any authorized committee or agent of such candidate, and which is not
made in concert with, or at the request or suggestion of, any candidate, or any author-
ized committee or agent of such candidate.
2 U.S.C. § 431 (17) (1994).
13. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47 (holding'that limitations on "expenditures for express advo-
cacy of candidates made totally independently of the candidate and his campaign" fail to serve
the government's interest in preventing actual or perceived corruptions because "[t]he ab-
sence of prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure with the candidate or his agent
not only undermines the value of the expenditure to the candidate, but also alleviates the dan-
ger that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for improper commitments from the can-
didate").
14. See id. at 40 (expressing concern that one particular expenditure limit "would make it
a federal criminal offense for a person or association to place a single one-quarter page adver-
tisement 'relative to a clearly identified candidate' in a major metropolitan newspaper")
(internal citation omitted).
15. See id. at 58-59 (holding that FECA's expenditure provisions "place substantial and di-
rect restrictions on the ability of candidates, citizens, and associations to engage in protected
political expression, restrictions that the First Amendment cannot tolerate").
16. According to FECA, the term "person" includes "an individual, partnership, commit-
tee, association, corporation, labor organization, or any other organization or group of per-
sons, but does not include the Federal Government or any authority of the Federal Govern-
ment." 2 U.S.C. § 431(11).
17. As used in FECA, the term "political committee" includes:
(A) any committee, club, association, or other group of persons which receives con-
tributions aggregating in excess of $1,000 during a calendar year or which makes ex-
penditures aggregating in excess of $1,000 during a calendar year; or
(B) any separate segregated fund established under the provisions of § 441b(b) of this
tide; or
(C) any local committee of a political party which receives contributions aggregating
in excess of $5,000 during a calendar year, or makes payments exempted from the
definition of contribution or expenditure as defined in paragraphs (8) and (9) aggre-
gating in excess of $5,000 during a calendar year, or makes contributions aggregating
in excess of $1,000 during a calendar year or makes expenditures aggregating in ex-
cess of $1,000 during a calendar year.
Id. § 431(4).
18. According to FECA, the term "multicandidate political committee" is defined as:
[A] political committee which has been registered under section 433 of this tile for a
period of not less than 6 months, which has received contributions from more than 50
persons, and, except for any State political party organization, has made contributions
to 5 or more candidates for Federal office.
Id. § 441a(4).
19. Under FECA, the term "political party" means "an association, committee, or organiza-
tion which nominates a candidate for election to any Federal office whose name appears on the
election ballot as the candidate of such association, committee, or organization." Id. § 431(16).
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to candidates 2' for federal office2 ("federal candidates") in excess of
certain, specified limits? ("contribution limits"). As a result of Buckley
and its progeny, supporters of federal candidates enjoy an unlimited
right to spend money on behalf of federal candidates' campaigns,
provided that they do so independently. 24 The sole expenditure
provision to survive the strict scrutiny of the Supreme Court was the
"Party Expenditure Provision," which limits the amount that political
parties can spend on behalf of federal candidates' campaigns when
20. A "contribution," according to FECA, includes:
(i) any gift, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit of money or anything of value
made by any person for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal office; or
(ii) the payment by any person of compensation for the personal services of another
person which are rendered to a political committee without charge for any purpose.
Id. § 431(8) (A).
21. According to FECA, the term "candidate" is defined as:
an individual who seeks nomination for election, or election, to Federal office, and
for purposes of this paragraph, an individual shall be deemed to seek nomination for
election, or election-
(A) if such individual has received contributions aggregating in excess of $5,000 or
has made expenditures aggregating in excess of $5,000; or
(B) if such individual has given his or her consent to another person to receive con-
tributions or make expenditures on behalf of such individual and if such person has
received such contributions aggregating in excess of $5,000 or has made such expen-
ditures aggregating in excess of $5,000.
Id. § 431 (2).
22. Under FECA, the term "federal office" includes: "the office of President or Vice Presi-
dent, or of Senator or Representative in, or Delegate or Resident Commissioner to, the Con-
gress." Id. § 431 (3).
23. Persons and political committees are forbidden from contributing more than $1000
per election to federal candidates. See FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, CAMPAIGN GUIDE FOR
POLITICAL PARTY COMMITTEES 15 (Aug. 1996). Multicandidate political committees and local,
state, and national political parties may not contribute more than $5000 per election to federal
candidates. See id.
Contributions to a federal candidate's campaign committee are treated as contributions to
the candidate himself. See 18 U.S.C. § 608(b) (4) (A) (1994) ("[C] ontributions to a named can-
didate made to any political committee authorized by such candidate, in writing, to accept con-
tributions on his behalf shall be considered to be contributions made to such candidate.").
24. See, e.g., Federal Elections Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S.
238 (1986) (holding independent expenditure provision, 2 U.S.C. § 441b, unconstitutional as
applied against a non-profit corporation that produced and distributed voter guides); Federal
Elections Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 498-500
(1985) (finding unconstitutional FECA provision making unlawful independent expenditures
of more than $1000 on behalf of presidential candidate opting to receive public campaign
funds); Federal Elections Comm'n v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 24, 36
(1981) (holding that agency relationship between local and national Republican organization
was neither endorsed nor precluded by FECA's independent expenditure provision, 2 U.S.C.
§ 441a(d) (3)); California Med. Ass'n v. Federal Election Comm'n, 453 U.S. 180, 195-200 (1981)
(finding no First Amendment violation where FEC brought enforcement action against medi-
cal association for contributions to political action committee formed to further association's
political interests).
25. The term "expenditure" under FECA includes "(i) any purchase, payment, distribu-
tion, loan, advance, deposit, or gift of money or anything of value, made by any person for the
purpose of influencing any election for Federal office; and (ii) a written contract, promise, or
agreement to make an expenditure." 2 U.S.C. § 431(9) (A).
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such expenditures are made "in connection with" a federal candi-
date's general election campaign.26 In June of 1996, the Supreme
Court had occasion to determine the constitutionality of the Party
Expenditure Provision as applied against a state political party in
Colorado. In Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. Federal
Election Commission,27 the Court narrowly upheld the constitutionality
of the Party Expenditure Provision, thus restricting campaign contri-
butions that can be classified as "party expenditures" under FECA.
At the same time, however, the Supreme Court indicated that politi-
cal parties, like other supporters of federal candidates, are capable of
making independent expenditures on behalf of federal candidates'
campaigns.28
Part I of this Note provides the historical background necessary to
a solid understanding of the Supreme Court's decision in Colorado
Republican. Part II provides the factual and procedural background
leading up to the Supreme Court's decision. Part III analyzes the
Supreme Court's decision, and Part IV discusses the implications of
the Court's holding.
I. THE ROAD TO COLORADO REPUBLICAN FEDERAL CAMPAIGN
COMMITTFE
In order to gain a better understanding of how the Supreme Court
decided Colorado Republican, it is necessary to review some important
decisions that the Court has rendered since Buckley. In each case, the
Court has been loyal to the framework it established in that landmark
26. The "Party Expenditure Provision" provides:
The national committee of a political party, or a State committee of a political party,
including any subordinate committee of a State committee, may not make any expen-
diture in connection with the general election campaign of a candidate for Federal of-
fice in a State who is affiliated with such party which exceeds-
(A) in the case of a candidate for election to the office of Senator, or of Representa-
tive from a State which is entitled to only one Representative, the greater of-
(i) 2 cents multiplied by the voting age population of the State (as certified under
subsection (e) of this section; or
(ii) $20,000; and
(B) in the case of a candidate for election to the office of Representative, Delegate, or
Resident Commissioner in any other State, $10,000.
Id. § 441a(d) (3).
27. 116 S. Ct. 2309 (1996).
28. Justice Breyer stated:
This case focuses upon the constitutionality of [the limits contained in the Party Ex-
penditure Provision] as applied to this case. We conclude that the First Amendment
prohibits the application of this provision to the kind of expenditure at issue here-





decision for determining whether FECA's contribution and expendi-
ture provisions violate the First Amendment.
A. California Medical Association v. Federal Election Commission
In Calfornia Medical Association v. Federal Election Commission, ap-
pellants California Medical Association ("CMA") and California
Medical Political Action Committee ("CALPAC") attempted to char-
acterize the FECA contribution limits applied against them as uncon-
stitutional expenditure limitations.3 CMA, a non-profit, unincorpo-
rated association of doctors and CALPAC, which was formed by CMA
to advance the political interests of its members, sought a declaration
by the Supreme Court that the contribution limitations violated their
First Amendment right of political speech . One of the FECA provi-
sions applied against CMA prohibited the CMA from giving more
than $5000 per year to "political committees," such as CALPAC.
32
Another FECA provision prohibited CALPAC from accepting more
than $5000 per year from any of its members, including CMA'3
Appellants argued that the $5000 annual contribution limit was an
unconstitutional independent expenditure restriction.m The thrust
of their argument was that CMA should have the First Amendment
right to contribute an unlimited amount of money to CALPAC be-
cause CALPAC has a constitutional right to spend an unlimited
amount of money on federal candidates' campaigns.?s Appellants at-
tempted to persuade the Court that CMA and CALPAC were really
the same legal entity, and that any restriction on CMA was tanta-
mount to a limitation on CALPAC's constitutional right to make in-
dependent expenditures.
Finding that CMA and CALPAC were, in fact, separate legal enti-
ties and invoking Buckley, the Court rejected appellants' attempt to
characterize a contribution limit as an independent expenditure re-
striction.' Instead, the Court determined that the Federal Election
29. 453 U.S. 182 (1981).
30. See id. at 195 (describing CMA and CALPAC's contention that contribution limitation
involved was "akin to an unconstitutional expenditure limitation").
31. See id. CMA and CALPAC attempted to persuade the Court to treat the FECA provi-
sions at issue, 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a) (1) (C), (f), as independent expenditure limitations, thereby
making them unconstitutional under the Buckley framework of analysis. See id. The Court de-
clined appellants' invitation, however, and determined that the FECA provision was indeed a
constitutional contribution limit. See id.
32. See id. at 185 n.1 (citing definitions of "political committee" and "multicandidate po-
litical committee").
33. See id.
34. Se id. at 182.
35. See id.
36. See id. at 195 ("(Appellants] contend that § 441a(a) (1) (C) is akin to an unconstitu-
1998]
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSIY LAW REvIEw [Vol. 47:963
Commission ("Commission") did not violate the First Amendment by
treating CMA's spending as a contribution and restricting it accord-
ingly.37 Central to the Court's reasoning was the fact that, even when
subjected to the FECA contribution limit, CMA still retained the con-
stitutional right to spend an unlimited sum of money on a federal
candidate's campaign provided such spending was done independ-
ently38 The Court held, in essence, that contributors do not have a
constitutional right to contribute an unlimited amount of money to a
PAC to enable the PAC to promote federal candidates, particularly
when contributors may do the promoting themselves, without using
the PAC as a conduit.39 Nevertheless, the Court reaffirmed its posi-
tion that multi-PACs are capable of making independent expendi-
tures.
40
B. Federal Election Commission v. National Conservative Political
Action Committee
In Federal Election Commission v. National Conservative Political Action
Committee,4' after the National Conservative Political Action Commit-
tee ("NCPAC") announced its intention to spend a large sum of
money in support of President Reagan's reelection, the Democratic
Party, the Democratic National Committee, and an individual who
was eligible to vote in the upcoming presidential election sought a
declaration by the Supreme Court that a particular provision4 2 of the
Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act was constitutional.43 The
provision in question criminalized the expenditure of more than
$1000 by an independent PAC that is made on behalf of a presiden-
tial candidate's general election campaign after that candidate has
agreed to receive public funds.44
In determining whether such a restriction on independent spend-
ing violated NCPAC's First Amendment rights, the Court once again
applied the Buckley framework of analysis. 45 The Supreme Court de-
tional expenditure limitation because it restricts the ability of CMA to engage in political
speech through a political committee, CALPAC.").
37. See id. at 197 (finding that the "speaker" entitled to First Amendment protection is
CALPAC, not CMA, which was only one of a number of contributors to CALPAG).
38. See id. at 195 ("Nothing in § 441a(a) (1) (C) limits the amount CMA or any of its mem-
bers may independently expend in order to advocate political views; rather, the statute restrains
only the amount that CMA may contribute to CALPAC.").
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. 470 U.S. 480 (1985).
42. See26U.S.C.§9012(f) (1994).
43. See National Conservative Comm., 470 U.S. at 482.
44. See26 U.S.C. § 9012(f) (1).
45. See National Conservative Comm., 470 U.S. at 497. The Court reaffirmed its adherence to
970
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termined that as an independent expenditure, NCPAC's proposed
spending enjoyed complete protection under the First Amendment,
and examined the government's interest in regulating such an ex-
penditure."' Stating that "the only legitimate and compelling gov-
ernment interests.., for restricting campaign finances" are to pre-
vent actual or apparent corruption, the Court considered whether
NCPAC's expenditure represented the threat of quid pro quo cor-
ruption.47 The Court concluded that without proof of prior coordi-
nation of the expenditure with the candidate, NCPAC's spending did
not threaten the integrity of the political process,48 and its interest in
political expression clearly outweighed the government's interests.49
Consequently, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional the provi-
sion of the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act that criminal-
ized any independent expenditures made to further a presidential
candidate's campaign.'o In doing so, the Court not only reaffirmed
its position that political committees are capable of making inde-
pendent expenditures, but also indicated that Congress may not
tread on the First Amendment rights of PACs by enacting a public
funding scheme for federal elections.
C. Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for
Life, Inc.
In Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Lfe, Inc.,51
the Supreme Court extended First Amendment protection to an in-
dependent expenditure made by Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc.
("MCFL"), a non-profit corporation formed for the purpose of pro-
moting its political agenda.5 To encourage voters to vote for pro-life
candidates in the upcoming federal and state elections, MCFL pub-
lished and distributed a newsletter to potential voters in September
1978." The newsletter listed all candidates for federal and state of-
fice and indicated which candidates supported MCFL's positions on
Buckley's distinction between evaluating contribution limits and independent expenditure re-
strictions in light of a First Amendment challenge to a particular FECA provision. See id. (citing
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47 (1976)).
46. See id.
47. See id. at 497-98.
48. See id.
49. See id. The Court went on to say that, even if it had concluded that the government's
interest in prohibiting NCPAC's expenditure was compelling, § 9012(f) was "a fatally overbroad
response." Id. at 498.
50. See id. at 501 (affirming District Court holding that § 9012(0 was unconstitutional).
51. 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
52. See id. at 263-65 (holding that non-profit organizations are not bound by FECA's ex-
penditure restrictions).
53. See id. at 243-44.
1998]
972 THE AMERICAN UNVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:963
the abortion issue.s4
The Federal Election Commission brought an enforcement action
against MCFL, charging the organization with violating a FECA pro-
vision that barred expenditures by corporations made in connection
with political campaigns. 5 The Court used a three-step analysis to
consider whether the FEC's enforcement of the provision infringed
MCFL's First Amendment rights. First, the Court determined that
the money spent in preparing and distributing the pro-life pre-
election newsletter was an "expenditure" as defined by FECA.57 Sec-
ond, the Court found the expenditure at issue was one made "in
connection with" a federal campaign.8 Third, noting that not all ex-
penditures made "in connection with" a federal campaign are subject
to FECA's disclosure provisions, the Court declared that FECA re-
stricts "'only funds used for communications which expressly advo-
cate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate." 5 9 Con-
sidering the facts presented in Massachusetts Citizens for Life, the Court
determined that the newsletter indeed advocated the election or de-
feat of clearly identified candidates. 60 Even though it acknowledged
that MCFL's expenditure was covered by FECA, the Court neverthe-
less found the provision requiring MCFL to report such expenditures
to be unconstitutional because finding to the contrary would place
54. See id.
55. See id. at 244-45. The particular FECA provision MCFL was charged with violating was
2 U.S.C. § 441b, which states, in pertinent part: "It is unlawful for any... corporation organ-
ized by authority of any law of Congress, to make a contribution or expenditure in connection
with any election to any political office .... " 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (1994).
56. See Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 245-50 (using three-step process and con-
cluding that MCFL's publication and distribution of the pre-election newsletter (1) was an ex-
penditure, (2) made in connection with a campaign, and (3) expressly advocated the election
or defeat of a clearly identified candidate).
57. See id. at 245-46. MCFL argued that its spending was not covered by FECA's prohibi-
tion against corporate expenditures made in connection with campaigns because it did not
give anything to any candidate, campaign committee, or political party or organization. See id.
In making this argument, MCFL relied upon the narrow definition of expenditure within
§ 441b, which defines an "expenditure" as "any direct or indirect payment, distribution, loan,
advance, deposit, or gift of money, or any services, or anything of value ... to any candidate,
campaign committee, or political party or organization, in connection with any election to any of the
offices referred to in this section." 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b) (2) (emphasis added). The Supreme
Court rejected MCFL's argument and relied instead on the more broadly worded definition of
expenditure contained in the general definitions section of FECA. See Massachusetts Citizens for
Life, 479 U.S. at 245-46. That section defines an "expenditure" as "any purchase, payment, dis-
tribution, loan, advance, deposit, or gift of money or anything of value, made by any person for
the purpose of influencing any election for Federal office." 2 U.S.C. § 431(9) (A) (i). Using this
definition of "expenditure" as its guidepost, the Court determined that the money spent pre-
paring and distributing the pre-election newsletter was done for the purpose of influencing an
election for Federal office and was, therefore, an "expenditure." See Massachusetts Citizens for
Life, 479 U.S. at 249-50.
58. See Massachusetts Citizens forLiff 479 U.S. at 245.
59. Id. at 248-49 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 80 (1976)).
60. See id. at 249.
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too onerous a burden on a non-profit corporation whose sole pur-
pose was to advance the political views of its members.6'
Having ascertained that persons, political committees, and non-
profit corporations are capable of making independent expenditures
and that such expenditures are entitled to full First Amendment pro-
tection, it was only a matter of time before a major political party
would challenge the Party Expenditure Provision, and assert its right
to spend money independently on its candidates' campaigns.
D. The Party Expenditure Provision-Interpreting Statutory Silence
FECA's Party Expenditure Provision states that "the national com-
mittee of a political party or a State committee of a political party, in-
cluding any subordinate committee of a State committee, may not
make expenditures in connection with the general election campaign
of a candidate for federal office," subject to certain limitations con-
tained in the statute.62 The statute addresses the matter of expendi-
tures made by political parties "in connection with" federal cam-
paigns ("connected expenditures") by stating that parties may make
connected expenditures up to the limits imposed by the formula con-
tained in the Party Expenditure Provision.6
Although the statute plainly indicates that parties are limited in
making connected expenditures, it is silent on the issue of whether
political parties may make independent expenditures on behalf of fed-
eral candidates. One possible interpretation of the statute's silence is
that the statute assumes that all expenditures made by political par-
ties on behalf of their candidates will always be done in coordination
with the respective candidates. On this view, all expenditures made
by political parties on behalf of federal campaigns would be subject
to the limitations outlined in the Party Expenditure Provision.
The FEC adopted this particular interpretation of the statute's si-
lence. The regulations adopted by the FEC to enforce the Party Ex-
penditure Provision clearly addressed the matter of independent ex-
penditures by political parties. Those regulations stated that political
parties "shall not make independent expenditures in connection with
the general election campaign of candidates for federal office."' Po-
litical parties were not permitted to make independent expenditures
because, in the FEC's view, political parties were "incapable" of mak-
61. See id. at 263-65 (listing three characteristics of MCFL that made it unconstitutional to
require the organization to comply with FECA's provisions).
62. See2 U.S.C.§ 441a(d)(3).
63. See id. § 441a(d) (1).
64. 11 C.F.R. § 110.7(b) (4) (1995), repealed by 6 1 Fed. Reg. 40,961 (1996).
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ing independent expenditures.5 The Commission was not alone in
its determination that political parties lacked the capacity to spend
money independently on behalf of federal candidates' campaigns.
The Supreme Court seemed to share this view.6
Although the Commission clearly prohibited independent spend-
ing by parties, it indicated that only connected expenditures would
count against the limits imposed by the Party Expenditure Provi-
sion.67 All party spending not made "in connection with" a federal
campaign was to be classified under one of the other reporting cate-
gories defined by FECA, and was not subject to the Party Expendi-
ture Provision's limitations.69
To assist parties in determining whether money spent on political
advertising would be treated as an expenditure made "in connection
with" a federal campaign, the Federal Election Commission issued
two advisory opinions. In one opinion, the Commission stated its
view that those advertisements which "effectively advocate the defeat
of a clearly identified candidate in connection with [a federal elec-
tion] and thus have the purpose of influencing the outcome of the
general election [of the federal candidate]" are covered by the Party
Expenditure Provision.7' In the other advisory opinion, the Commis-
sion stated that the limits contained in the Party Expenditure Provi-
sion applied to advertisements which "(1) depicted a clearly identi-
fied candidate and (2) conveyed an electioneering message."' 2
II. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION V. COLORADO REPUBL!CAN FEDERAL
CAMPAIGN COMMITEf'
A. Facts and Procedural History
In April 1986, prior to the selection of the Republican and Demo-
65. See FEC Advisory Opinion 1985-14, 1 Fed. Election Campaign Fin. Guide (CCH)
§ 5819, at 11,186 n.4 (July 18, 1985) ("Party political committees are incapable of making inde-
pendent expenditures."); see also FEC Advisory Opinion 1984-15, 1 Fed. Election Campaign Fin.
Guide (CCH) § 5766, at 11,070 n.2 (July 18, 1984) ("[A] national party committee is incapable
of making independent expenditures.").
66. SeeFederal Election Comm'n v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27,
28 n.1 (1981).
67. See FEC Advisory Opinion 1984-15, 1 Fed. Election Campaign Election Fin. Guide, at
11,070.
68. See2 U.S.C. § 434(b) (4).
69. See FEC Advisory Opinion 1984-15, 1 Fed. Election Campaign Fin. Guide, at 11,070.
70. See id.; see also FEC Advisory Opinion 1985-14, 1 Fed. Election Campaign Fin. Guide, at
16-17.
71. See FEC Advisory Opinion 1985-14, 1 Fed. Election Campaign Fin. Guide, at 11,070.
72. Id. at 11,185.
73. 839 F. Supp. 1448 (D. Colo. 1993), rev'd, 59 F.3d 1015 (10th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 116 S. Ct.
2309 (1996).
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cratic nominees for an open seat in the U.S. Senate from Colorado,
the Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee (the
"Colorado Party") spent $15,000 to broadcast a radio advertisement
against then-Congressman Timothy Wirth (D-Colo.), the presumptive
Democratic nominee.74 According to the formula in the Party Ex-
penditure Provision,7s each political party could spend approximately
$103,000 in connection with its candidate's campaign for the U.S.
Senate seat from Colorado. 6
Following the airing of the negative radio advertisements against
Congressman Wirth, the State Democratic Party lodged a complaint
with the Federal Election Commission alleging that the Colorado
Party failed to report77 as a connected expenditure the $15,000 used
to purchase air time for the advertisements. 7 Agreeing with the State
Democratic Party and after administrative settlement negotiations
failed, the Commission filed a complaint against the Colorado Party
in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado alleg-
ing that the party failed to comply with FECA's reporting require-
ments.79
As an unincorporated political association, the Colorado Party was
74. See Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 116 S.
Ct. 2309, 2314 (1996). The content of radio advertisement, entitled"Wirth Facts #1," was as
follows:
Paid for by the Colorado Republican State Central Committee
Here in Colorado we're used to politicians who let you know where they stand, and I
thought we could count on Tim Wirth to do the same. But the last few weeks have
been a real eye-opener. Ijust saw some ads where Tim Wirth said he's for a strong de-
fense and a balanced budget. But according to his record, Tim Wirth voted against
every new weapon system in the last five years. And he voted against the balanced
budget amendment. [Congressman] Tim Wirth has a right to run for the Senate, but
he doesn't have a right to change the facts.
Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 839 F. Supp. at 1451.
75. Section 441a(d) (3) of FECA provides, in pertinent part:
The national committee of a political party, or a State committee of a political party,
including any subordinate committee of a State committee, may not make any expen-
diture in connection with the general election campaign of a candidate for Federal of-
fice in a State who is affiliated with such party which exceeds-
in the case of a candidate for election to the office of Senator .... the greater of-
2 cents multiplied by the voting age population of the State ... ; or
$20,000 ....
2 U.S.C. § 441a(d) (3) (1994).
76. See Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 116 S. Ct. at 2314 (quoting 2 U.S.C.
§ 441a(c), (d) (3) (A) (I)).
77. See Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 839 F. Supp. at 1450 (explaining that the
Campaign Committee instead listed $15,000 as an "operating expense").
78. See Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 116 S. Ct. at 2314. The State Democratic
Party claimed that CRFCC's purchase of air time for the radio advertisements was an
.expenditure in connection with the general election campaign of a candidate for Federal of-
fice." Id. (quoting 2 U.S.C. § 441a(d) (3)).
79. See id.
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required, under FECA, to submit periodic reports to the Commission
detailing its Party Expenditure Provision spending.80 In its quarterly
report covering the period of time during which the expenditure oc-
curred, the Colorado Party had listed the amount spent on the air
time for the anti-Wirth advertisements as an "operating expense"
rather than as a Party Expenditure Provision expenditure. 8 The
Colorado Party claimed that its expenditure of $15,000 on the anti-
Wirth advertisement was not an expenditure made in connection
812with a federal campaign.
The gist of the Colorado Party's argument was that at the time the
advertisements were developed and aired, the Republican party had
not yet selected its candidate for the open U.S. Senate seat. Party of-
ficials maintained that they developed the anti-Wirth advertisements
independently, without consulting any of the candidates seeking the
Republican nomination for the open Senate seat. According to party
officials, they were not obligated to report such spending under the
Party Expenditure Provision because the facts clearly demonstrated
that the development of the advertisements and the purchase of air
time were not accomplished in connection with any particular candi-
date's campaign. Under this view, the $15,000 spent by the party was
properly reported as an operating expense and did not count against
the $103,000 limitation of the Party Expenditure Provision.83 In addi-
tion to denying that it violated FECA's disclosure requirements, the
Colorado Party also claimed that the Party Expenditure Provision vio-
lated the First Amendment by prohibiting political parties from mak-
ing independent expenditures.84
B. The District Court's Opinion
The District Court adopted a two-step approach to determine
whether the Commission correctly classified the $15,000 spent by the
Colorado Party as a connected expenditure that should have been
reported as a Party Expenditure Provision expenditure. First, the
court analyzed whether the expenditure was a coordinated expendi-
ture or an independent expenditure. The court explained that in-
80. See Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 839 F. Supp. at 1451. The relevant FECA
provision, § 434(b) (4) (H) (iv), mandates disclosure of all § 441a(d) (3) expenditures that are
made "in connection with the general election campaign of a candidate for Federal office." 2
U.S.C. §§ 434(b) (4) (H) (iv), 441a(d) (3).
81. See Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 839 F. Supp. at 1451. The Colorado Party
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dependent expenditures warranted greater First Amendment protec-
tion than coordinated expenditures, which are treated as contribu-
tions5 and may be "more freely limited."6 The court defined a coor-
dinated expenditure as "one made in cooperation with, or with the
consent of, a candidate, his agents, or an authorized committee of a
candidate.87 In contrast, an independent expenditure was defined as
"one made without the knowledge or permission of a candidate, his
agent, or his campaign committee. '' 8
Although the facts seemed to indicate that the expenditure in
question was an independent expenditure, the court found that the
Colorado Party properly classified its spending as "coordinated" be-
cause the Supreme Court 9 and the Federal Election Commission 9°
heretofore had held that political parties were incapable of making
independent expenditures. Suggesting that it needed to justify its
conclusion further, the court continued to address the Colorado
Party's argument by asserting that it was immaterial whether or not
the Republican candidate with whom the Colorado Party
"coordinated" had been selected at the time the anti-Wirth adver-
85. Section 441a(a) (7) (B) (i) of FECA provides as follows:
For purposes of this subsection-
(B) expenditures made by any person in cooperation, consultation, or concert, with,
or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate, his authorized political committees, or
their agents, shall be considered to be a contribution to such candidate ....
2 U.S.C. § 441a(a) (7) (B) (i).
86. See Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 839 F. Supp. at 1452 (noting proposition
that contribution limits are subject to less exacting scrutiny than restriction on expenditures
(citing Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 260
(1986); Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S.
480, 491 (1985); California Med. Ass'n v. Federal Election Comm'n, 453 U.S. 182, 194, 196-97
(1981); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47 n.53 (1976))).
87. Id. (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47 n.53).
88. Id. (citing 2 U.S.C. § 431(17); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47 n.53).
89. See id. at 1452-53. In reaching its conclusion that party expenditures are, by definition,
"coordinated," the District Court relied upon a footnote in the Supreme Court's opinion in
FederalElction Comm'n v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27 (1981). In footnote
one of that opinion, the Supreme Court stated, inter alia, that "[plarty committees are consid-
ered incapable of making 'independent' expenditures in connection with the campaigns of
their party's candidates." Id. at 27 n.1.
90. See Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 839 F. Supp. at 1453. Citing Buckley, 424
U.S. at 109-10, and Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. at 38, for the proposition that
the FEC's advisory opinions are entitled to deference by a reviewing court because the FEC has
"the 'primary and substantial responsibility for administering and enforcing [FECA]'" coupled
with "extensive rulemaking and adjudicative powers." The District Court gave great weight to
two FEC advisory opinions in particular: FEC Advisory Opinion 1985-14, 1 Fed. Election Cam-
paign Fin. Guide (CCH) 1 5819 (July 18, 1985), and FEC Advisory Opinion 1984-15, 1 Fed.
Election Campaign Fin. Guide (CCH) 1 5766 (Aug. 16, 1984). Both advisory opinions state
unequivocally that "[p]arty political committees are incapable of making independent expen-
ditures." FEC Advisoy Opinion 1985-14, 1 Fed. Election Campaign Fin. Guide, at 11,186 n.4;
FEC Advisory Opinion 1984-15, 1 Fed. Election Campaign Fin. Guide, at 11,070 n.2.
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tisements were created or aired.9 Relying on a Commission advisory
opinion, the District Court reasoned that the eventual Republican
candidate for the open U.S. Senate seat from Colorado would ulti-
mately benefit from the advertisements run by the Colorado Party
against then-Congressman Wirth 2
In the second step of its analysis, the court analyzed whether the
"coordinated" expenditure was one made "in connection with" the
Republican candidate's campaign and therefore was subject to being
reported as a Party Expenditure Provision expenditure." Finding no
controlling precedent, the District Court relied instead upon a Su-
preme Court decision interpreting the "in connection with" language
found in a different FECA provision.94 The District Court proceeded
to apply the "express advocacy" test used by the Supreme Court in
Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc.95 to de-
termine whether the coordinated expenditure was also a connected
expenditure.96 The test holds that the term "expenditure" encom-
passes "only funds used for communications that expressly advocate the
election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate."97
In applying the "express advocacy" test to determine whether the
Colorado Party's coordinated expenditure was made "in connection
91. See Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 839 F. Supp. at 1453.
92. See id. (citing FEC Advisory Opinion 1984-15 and Buckley for the proposition that "it is
irrelevant whether a candidate has been nominated at the time the expenditure is made....
[because] [i] t was made on behalf of the Republican candidate, whomever that might be").
93. See id. at 1451, 1453.
94. See id. at 1453 (relying on Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life,
Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986), in which Supreme Court interpreted"in connection with" language
found in FECA § 441b).
Unlike § 441a(d) (3), which concerns contributions or expenditures made by party commit-
tees, § 441b applies to contributions and expenditures made by national banks, corporations,
and labor organizations. Compare 2 U.S.C. § 441a(d) (3) (1994), with id. § 441b. Despite this
difference, however, the District Court found a basis for applying the "express advocacy" test,
discussed infra, in a rule of statutory construction that holds that "identical words used in dif-
ferent parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning." Colorado Republican Fed.
Campaign Comm., 839 F. Supp. at 1453 (quoting Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 484 (1990)).
The court noted, as well, that this rule of statutory construction should normally be applied
where the two different sections of the same act have the same purpose. See id. Finding that §§
441a(d) (3) and 441b were both aimed at regulating contributions and expenditures from
multi-person organizations, the District Court determined that the "express advocacy" test was
appropriately applied in analyzing whether an expenditure was made "in connection with" a
general election campaign for federal office under § 441a(d) (3). See id.
95. 479 U.S. 242 (1986). In Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizensfor Life, Inc., the
FEC charged the non-profit corporation with making an expenditure in connection with cam-
paigns for Federal office when the pro-life organization published and distributed a newsletter
encouraging potential voters to vote for "pro-life" candidates in a forthcoming election. See id.
at 242-45. In determining whether the pro-life organization's expenditure was one made "in
connection with" the upcoming elections within the meaning of FECA § 441b, the Supreme
Court applied a test it first announced in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 80 (1976).




with" the eventual Republican senatorial nominee's campaign, the
District Court focused on the actual language used in the anti-Wirth
advertisement."8 Using Buckley as its guidepost, the court found that
the anti-Wirth advertisement did not contain words expressly advo-
cating action on behalf of or against a particular candidate." Conse-
quently, the court held that the Colorado Party's expenditure of
$15,000 on "Wirth Facts #1," though coordinated, did not constitute
an expenditure made "in connection with" a general election cam-
paign for federal office.'0 As a result, the Colorado Party did not vio-
late FECA's reporting requirements by failing to report the expendi-
ture as a Party Expenditure Provision expenditure.' By ruling that
the Colorado Party did not violate FECA, the District Court side-
stepped the issue of whether the Party Expenditure Provision was
constitutional.' 2
C. The Tenth Circuit's Opinion
Following the District Court's decision granting the Colorado
Party's motion for summary judgment and dismissing its counter-
claim that the Party Expenditure Provision is unconstitutional, the
Commission and the Colorado Party appealed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.0 3 In reviewing the District
Court's opinion, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the lower court's de-
termination that any expenditure by a political party is, by definition
"coordinated."0 4
In analyzing whether the expenditure was one made "in connec-
tion with" the eventual Republican Senate nominee's campaign and
thus subject to reporting requirements of the Party Expenditure Pro-
98. See id. at 1455 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 42, for the proposition that reviewing courts
should examine the actual wording used in determining whether speech is "express advo-
cacy").
99. See id. The District Court, quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 46 n.52, listed specific words
identified by the Supreme Court as "'express words of advocacy of election or defeat, such as
.vote for,' 'elect,' 'support,' 'cast your ballot for,' 'Smith for Congress,' 'vote against,' 'defeat,'
or 'reject.'" Id. The District Court found that the "Wirth Facts #1" advertisement contained, at
most, "an indirect plea for action" that was not enough to constitute "express advocacy." See id.
at 1455-56.
100. See id. at 1456-57.
101. See id.
102. See id. (explaining that District Court not required to address constitutional challenge
to § 441a(d) (3) because court determined that expenditure in question was not one made "in
connection with" campaign for federal office).
103. See Federal Election Comm'n v. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 59 F.3d
1015, 1017 (10th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 116 S. Ct 2309 (1996).
104. See id. at 1019. Like the District Court below, the Tenth Circuit cited Federal Election
Commission v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, 454 U.S. 27, 29 n.1 (1981), for the
proposition that political parties are incapable of making "independent" expenditures.
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vision, however, the Tenth Circuit rejected the lower court's reliance
on "express advocacy."' 05 The Tenth Circuit found unclear Congress'
intent regarding the appropriate standard for judging whether a co-
ordinated expenditure was a connected expenditure, and deter-
mined that the proper approach was to defer to the Commission's in-
terpretation of the statutory language. °6
In its review of two Commission advisory opinions defining the ap-
propriate standard for determining whether the Colorado Party's co-
ordinated expenditure was made "in connection with" a federal cam-
paign, the Tenth Circuit found that "[the Party Expenditure
Provision] applies to coordinated spending that involves a clearly
identified candidate and an electioneering message, without regard
to whether that message constitutes express advocacy."' °7 The Tenth
Circuit found that the anti-Wirth advertisement met both criteria,
and concluded that the Colorado Party's expenditure was subject to
disclosure under the Party Expenditure Provision."" Moreover, it
concluded that the party violated the Act by listing the $15,000 spent
on the anti-Wirth advertisement as an operating expense on its quar-
terly report to the Commission.'09
105. See Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 59 F.3d at 1020-21. The Tenth Circuit
stated that the District Court's reliance on Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), andFederalElection
Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986), was inapposite because
amendments to FECA subsequent to the Buckley decision called into question the notion that
both independent and coordinated expenditures are necessarily ones that "expressly advocate"
the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate for federal office. See Colorado Republican
Fed. Campaign Comm., 59 F.3d at 1020-21. The Court of Appeals noted the different language
defining "independent" and "coordinated" expenditures in 2 U.S.C. § 431(9) (B) (ix) and
§ 431(17), respectively. See 2 U.S.C. § 431(9) (B) (ix), (17) (1994). Although the definition of
"independent" expenditures explicitly contains the "expressly advocating" language, the defini-
tion of "coordinated" expenditures does not. See Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 59
F.3d at 1020-21.
106. See Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 59 F.3d at 1021. The Court of Appeals,
finding no guidance in the statute for a particular standard for determining whether a coordi-
nated expenditure was made "in connection with" a campaign, determined that the appropri-
ate course was to defer to the FEC's interpretive guidance on the issue. See id. In so doing, the
Tenth Circuit stated that it was following the Supreme Court's command in Chevron, U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984), that"[when] the statute is si-
lent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the
agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute." Id.
107. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 59 F.3d at 1022. The Court of Appeals first
reviewed FEC Advisoiy Opinion 1984-15, in which the FEC determined that certain sums that the
Republican Party planned to expend for the purpose of running negative television advertise-
ments disparaging potential Democratic candidates for the presidency were covered by
§ 441a(d) (3) because the advertisements in question "effectively advocate[d] the defeat of a
clearly identified candidate" and because they "[had] the purpose of influencing the outcome
of the general election for President of the United States." Id. at 1021. The Tenth Circuit also
referenced FEC Advisory Opinion 1985-14, in which the FEC explicitly stated that § 441a(d) (3)
regulates expenditures that "both (1) depict[] a clearly identified candidate and (2) convey[]
an electioneering message." Id. at 1022.
108. See id. at 1021.
109. See id. at 1022-23. The court found that "Wirth Facts #1" was directed at a clearly iden-
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In finding a violation of the Party Expenditure Provision, the
Tenth Circuit could not avoid passing on the constitutionality of the
Party Expenditure Provision. " ° Considering whether the expendi-
ture limitations contained in the Party Expenditure Provision vio-
lated the Colorado Party's First Amendment rights, the Tenth Circuit
characterized those restrictions as contribution limits, stating that
"Buckley accepted the FECA's treatment of expenditures by national
and state committees of political parties as contributions, as have sub-
sequent opinions of the Supreme Court."'' u
Treating the expenditure in question as a contribution, the Tenth
Circuit proceeded to analyze whether the government's interest in
regulating the contribution was outweighed by the party's interest in
making it."2 In reviewing the history of the Supreme Court's treat-
ment of contribution and expenditure limits, the Court of Appeals
determined that contribution limits require a less compelling gov-
ernment interest to survive First Amendment scrutiny than do ex-
penditure limits."' Identifying the government's interest in limiting
contributions from political parties as "preventing corruption or the
appearance of corruption,"" 4 the Tenth Circuit determined that it
could not rule out the possibility that contributions from political
parties might represent a threat to the integrity of the political proc-
ess."' Finding that the government's interest in limiting political
party contributions outweighed the party's interest in making them,
the Tenth Circuit held that the Party Expenditure Provision was con-
stitutional."
6
tified candidate because it "referenced Wirth's senatorial aspirations and challenged his per-
sonal integrity and campaign statements in the context of a current election." Id. at 1022. The
court also found that the advertisement "unquestionably contained an electioneering mes-
sage." Id. at 1023. In reaching this conclusion, the Tenth Circuit relied on FEC Advisory Opin-
ion 1984-15 and FEC Advisory Opinion 1985-14, which stated that electioneering messages in-
clude advertisements that "question or challenge the candidate's statements, position, or
record," id., or are "'designed to urge the public to elect a certain candidate or party.'" Id.
(quoting United States v. United Auto Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 587 (1957)).
110. Seeid. at 1023.
111. Id. at 1021 (citing Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc.,
479 U.S. at 259-60; Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 454
U.S. 27, 28 n.1 (1981); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)).
112. See Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 59 F.3d at 1024.
113. See id. at 1023 (agreeing with FEC's position "that Buckley and later cases endorse dis-
tinctions between independent expenditures and contributions, and that other FECA contribu-
tion ceilings have consistently been upheld as constitutional by the Supreme Court").
114. Id. at 1024 (listing twin aims of FECA as determined by the Supreme Court in Buckley,
424 U.S. at 25-26).
115. See id. ("We cannot say the dangers of domination that underlay the Supreme Court's




THE AMERICAN UNIVERSrIY LAw REvIEw [Vol. 47:963
D. The Supreme Court's Decision
1. Justice Breyer's opinion
In reviewing the record upon which the Tenth Circuit based its
opinion, Justice Stephen Breyer, writing the plurality opinion for a
sharply divided Supreme Court,"17 first recognized the goals of
FECA's enactment, which are to prevent the appearance of corrup-
tion of the electoral process and to reduce the costs of campaigns.
Second, the Court examined the means chosen by Congress to effec-
tuate the Act, namely the imposition of limits on contributions to
candidates for federal office, and the restriction of the amount that
candidates and others may spend on behalf of the candidate's cam-
paign."9 Third, Justice Breyer recited the history of the Court's ex-
amination of FECA's provisions in light of various First Amendment
challenges. 120 In examining whether a particular FECA provision vio-
lated the First Amendment, Justice Breyer found that the Court has
historically applied a strict scrutiny test."' In so doing, Justice Breyer
noted that the Supreme Court has held that FECA provisions impos-
ing expenditure limits violate the First Amendment2 while those
117. The Court divided into four camps. The lead opinion was written by Justice Stephen
Breyer, who was joined by Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and David H. Souter. See Colorado
Republican Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 116 S. Ct. 2309, 2312 (1996). Jus-
tice Anthony M. Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Antonin
Scalia, concurred in the judgment and dissented in part. See id. at 2321 (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a separate opinion concur-
ring in the judgment and dissenting in part, in which ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia
joined in Parts I and III. See id. at 2323 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Finally, Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, wrote a dissenting
opinion. See id. at 2332 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
118. See id. (listing goals of FECA).
119. See id. (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 608, 610 (1970 & Supp. IV 1974)).
120. See id. at 2313 (citing Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc.,
479 U.S. 238 (1986); Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action
Comm., 470 U.S. 480 (1985); California Med. Ass'n v. Federal Election Comm'n, 453 U.S. 182
(1981); Buckleyv. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)).
121. See id. ("[T]he Court essentially weighed the First Amendment interest in permitting
candidates (and their supporters) to spend money to advance their political views, against a
'compelling' governmental interest in assuring the electoral system's legitimacy, protecting it
from the appearance and reality of corruption." (citing Massachusetts CitizensforLife, 479 U.S. at
256-63; National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. at 493-501; California Med. Ass'n,
453 U.S. at 193-99; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14-23)).
122. See id. Justice Breyer listed the FECA expenditure provisions that the Supreme Court
found unconstitutional. According to Justice Breyer, in Buckley, the Court found unconstitu-
tional expenditure provisions that limited the amount of money that a candidate could spend
on behalf of his own campaign and those that restricted the right of others to spend money
independently to further the candidate's campaign. See id. (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 39-51, 54-
58). Furthermore, Breyer noted that, in National Conservative Political Action Committee, the Su-
preme Court struck down limitations on the right of political committees to spend money in-
dependently on behalf of a candidate for national office. See id. (citing National Conservative
PoliticalAction Comm., 470 U.S. at 497).
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merely restricting contributions do not.'
After explaining the manner in which political parties'
"contributions" to candidates are regulated by FECA,124 the Court
went on to analyze whether the Party Expenditure Provision was un-
constitutional, either on its face or as applied to the defendants in
the underlying case.2s It focused on the lack of evidence indicating
coordination between the Colorado Party and the ultimate Republi-
can nominee for the open U.S. Senate seat in developing the anti-
Wirth advertisement, and determined that, absent such evidence, the
Colorado Party's expenditure must be treated as an "independent
expenditure" rather than as a "contribution.
In reaching its conclusion, the Supreme Court, unlike the lower
courts, was not compelled to defer to the Commission's interpreta-
tion of FECA's silence regarding whether political parties were capa-
127ble of making independent expenditures. The Court also disa-
vowed its own statement of support for the view that political parties
were incapable of making independent expenditures in Federal Elec-
tion Commission v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee.12 The
Court explained its departure from the route taken by the lower
123. See id. ("The provisions that the Court found constitutional mostly imposed contribution
limits-limits that apply both when an individual or political committee contributes money
directly to a candidate and also when they indirectly contribute by making expenditures that
they coordinate with the candidate." (citing California Med. Ass'n, 453 U.S. at 193-99; Buckley,
424 U.S. at 23-36,46-48)).
124. See id. at 2313-14. The Court explained that FECA specifically exempts political parties
from the contribution limits contained in § 441a(a)(1), (2), and (3), which apply to"persons"
and "multicandidate political committees." See id. at 2313. Instead, § 441a(d)(1), the "Party
Expenditure Provision," explicitly provides that political parties "may make expenditures in
connection with the general election campaign of candidates for Federal office" according to
the formula established in § 441a(d) (3) (A) (i) and (ii). See id. at 2314 (citing 2 U.S.C.
§ 441a(d) (3) (A) (i)-(ii) (1994)).
125. See id. at 2314-15.
126. See id. at 2315. The Supreme Court held that the government must present particular-
ized evidence of actual coordination between a political party and a candidate in order for the
Party Expenditure Provision to apply. See id. Because the chairman of the Colorado Party
stated in a deposition that it was the practice of the party to assist potential Republican candi-
dates prior to their nomination, the government argued that such an admission amounted to
evidence of coordination. See id. The Court dismissed the government's argument by saying
that the chairman's remarks amounted to nothing more than "general descriptions of party
practice." Id.
127. See id. at 2318-19.
128. Id. at 2318. In Federal Election Commission v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee,
454 U.S. 27, 28-29 n.1 (1981), the Court stated that"[elxpenditures by party committees are
known as 'coordinated' expenditures and are subject to the monetary limits of § 441a(d)." Id.
(citing 6 FEC Record, No. 11, at 6 (Nov. 1980)). The Court in Democratic Senatorial Campaign
Committee also stated unequivocally that both national and state party committees are consid-
ered "incapable" of making independent expenditures and are "forbidden" from doing so by
the FEC. See id. (citing 11 C.F.R. § 110.7(b) (4) (1981)). The Supreme Court distanced itself
from this pronouncement in Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, calling its previous
statement of unqualified support for the FEC's interpretation "dicta." See Colorado Republican
Fed. Campaign Comm., 116 S. Ct. at 2318.
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courts by stating that, before enforcing the Party Expenditure Provi-
sion against a political party, the Commission must first make an
"empirical judgment" that party officials have actually coordinated
with a candidate.'2 Justice Breyer noted that while one Commission
advisory opinion presumes coordination, the presupposition does
not foreclose the possibility that a party could make an independent
expenditure 3
After its conclusion that the expenditure in question was made in-
dependently, the Court proceeded to analyze whether the govern-
ment may constitutionally limit independent spending by political
parties. 3' The Court did so by weighing the interest of political par-
ties in making independent expenditures against the government's
interest in prohibiting such expenditures. 3 2 Considering the politi-
cal parties' interests first, the Court found that expression by a politi-
cal party is a "'core' First Amendment activity" because it reflects the
shared views of its members and is done for the purpose of convinc-
ing potential voters to become actively involved in democratic gov-
ernment. 33 The Court then examined the purpose of the Party Ex-
penditure Provision and determined that the only rational
government interest in restricting independent expenditures by po-
litical parties was to limit the overall cost of elections for federal of-
fice.134 Weighing this interest against a political party's interest in ex-
ercising its "core" First Amendment rights, the Court found the
party's interest more compelling. Therefore, the Court held that
prohibiting the Colorado Party from making an independent expen-
diture on behalf of a federal candidate, absent any evidence of prior
coordination between the party and the candidate, amounted to a
violation of the Colorado Party's First Amendment rights. 5
129. See Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 116 S. Ct. at 2318.
130. See id. To buttress its view that the FEC does not strictly forbid parties from making
independent expenditures, the Court cited a different FEC advisory opinion that suggested
that the FEC recognizes that sometimes parties do, in fact, make independent expenditures.
See id.
131. See id. at 2315. The Court reaffirmed its commitment to the framework for analyzing
First Amendment challenges to FECA laid down in Buckley. See id.
132. See id. at 2316.
133. See id. (citing Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214
(1989)). In Eu, the Supreme Court stated that political parties have the same right to freely
associate that individuals have long enjoyed under the First Amendment. See Eu, 489 U.S. at
224.
134. See Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 116 S. Ct. at 2316-17. Upon his review of
the legislative history of the Party Expenditure Provision, Justice Breyer came to the view that
Congress actually intended to "enhance what was seen as an important and legitimate role for
political parties in American elections." Id. (citing Federal Election Comm'n v. Democratic
Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27,41 (1981)).
135. See id. at 2315.
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In so holding, Justice Breyer narrowly avoided addressing the
Colorado Party's facial challenge to the Party Expenditure Provi-
sion."' Although four of the nine Supreme Courtjustices would have
invalidated the provision on its face,137 Justice Breyer argued that, be-
cause the Court had already determined that the provision was un-
constitutionally applied, it did not need to address the Colorado
Party's challenge because it was not a crucial element for adjudicat-
ing the dispute. lss In addition, he was hesitant to "overrule sua
sponte [the] Court's entire campaign finance jurisprudence, devel-
oped in many cases over the last 20 years," especially given the fact
that the parties had not properly briefed the issue.'39
2. Justice Kennedy's concurrence
Concurring only in the judgment of the plurality opinion, Justice
Anthony M. Kennedy wrote separately to express his view that the
Court should have addressed the Colorado Party's facial challenge to
the Party Expenditure Provision.14 He criticized the plurality for en-
gaging in a protracted discussion on whether the Commission's pre-
sumption that political parties are incapable of making independent
expenditures was a valid implementation of the Party Expenditure
Provision. 4' Kennedy focused instead on the statute, finding that,
when applied to political parties, FECA imposes impermissible bur-
dens on parties to determine when certain expenditures are pro-
tected by the First Amendment.
42
136. See id. at 2319-21.
137. See id. at 2321 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also id. at
2331 (ThomasJ., dissenting). Justice Kennedyjoined by Justice Scalia and the ChiefJustice,
advocated the creation of an exemption for political parties from limitations on contributions,
which he argues is consistent with Buckle, because "political party spending 'in cooperation,
consultation, or concert with' a candidate does not fit within [the Court's) description of
'contributions' in Buckley." Id. at 2321-22 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). In addition to agreeing that the Party Expenditure Provision is facially unconstitutional,
Justice Thomas argued that the distinction drawn between independent expenditures and con-
tributions by the Buckley court was one "that lacks constitutional significance" and went on to
state that he "would not adhere to it." Id. at 2325-29.
138. See id. at 2320 (arguing that Colorado Party's counterclaim is mooted because Court
found Party Expenditure Provision unconstitutional as applied).
139. Id. at 2321.
140. See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
141. See id. (characterizing plurality's discussion of FEC presumption as irrelevant).
142. See id. Section 441a(a) (7) (B) (i) of FECA states that: "expenditures made by any per-
son in cooperation, consultation, or concert, with or at the request or suggestion of, a candi-
date, his authorized political committees, or their agents, shall be considered to be a contribu-
tion to such candidate." 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(7)(B) (1994). Justice Kennedy argued that the
effect of defining the term "person" in § 441a(a) (7) (B) (i) to include political parties, and thus
treating party expenditures as contributions, is "to restrict any party's spending in a specific
campaign for or against a candidate and so to burden a party in expending its own money for
its own speech." Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 116 S. Ct. at 2321.
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Although Justice Kennedy did not question the notion that contri-
butions may be regulated consistent with Buckley, 43 he argued that
the Court was not bound by the Government's characterization of
the Colorado Party's expenditure for the anti-Wirth advertisements as
a contribution rather than as an expenditure.'44 Noting that the Buck-
ley Court never addressed potential First Amendment challenges to
expenditure limits as applied to parties,45 Kennedy drew a distinction
between political parties and all other potential contributors, arguing
that political parties are unique institutions.' 46 According to Justice
Kennedy, the parties should not necessarily be treated the same as
other contributors under FECA because of their special characteris-
tics. 47  In his view, the application of the Court's prior decisions,
which upheld contribution limits in certain situations, was inappro-
priate in determining whether political party contributions could be
regulated consistent with the First Amendment.
48
3. Justice Thomas' approach
In the first part of his separate opinion, which was joined by Justice
Antonin Scalia and Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Justice
Clarence Thomas strenuously disagreed with Justice Breyer's asser-
tion that it was unnecessary for the Court to consider the Colorado
Party's facial challenge to the Party Expenditure Provision. 49 Despite
the fact that the parties had not briefed the issue extensively, he rea-
soned that the Court was not incapable of weighing the government's
interest in regulating political party expenditures against the party's
interest in First Amendment expression, or of testing the means
adopted by the government to effectuate its interest.1'5 Justice Tho-
143. See Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 116 S. Ct. at 2321 (citing Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 23-38 (1976)).
144. See id. at 2321-22.
145. See id. at 2322 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 58 n.66).
146. See id. at 2322-23. Justice Kennedy explained that, unlike other would be contributors,
the interests of political parties are inextricably linked with those of their chosen candidates.
See id. Kennedy also noted that parties must advance their interest through candidates and that
candidates, in turn, count on their party's crucial support in an election. See id.
147. See id. at 2322 ("In my view, we should not transplant the reasoning of cases upholding
ordinary contribution limitations to a case involving FECA's restrictions on political party
spending.").
148. See id. (stating that contribution limits applied to individuals, upheld in Buckley, 424
U.S. at 23-38, and to associations, upheld in California Medical Association v. Federal Election Com-
mission, 453 U.S. 182, 193-99 (1981), should not control outcome when judging constitutional-
ity of limitations on political party spending).
149. See id. at 2323 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (finding
"unpersuasive"Justice Breyer's arguments for not addressing Colorado Party's counterclaim).
150. See id. at 2324. Although Justice Thomas acknowledged that the Colorado Party's chal-
lenge to a limitation on coordinated expenditures was one of first impression, he argued that,
because the Court granted certiorari, it should address the issue. See id. In addition, Justice
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mas further argued that failing to address the constitutionality of the
Party Expenditure Provision would leave political parties uncertain
about what future conduct would constitute "coordination" and thus
subject them to the Party Expenditure Provision's limits. 51  He pre-
dicted that this uncertainty would have a chilling effect on parties'
exercise of their First Amendment rights.
52
Unlike the Chief Justice and Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas argued
that the court should have gone beyond simply declaring the Party
Expenditure Provision unconstitutional. Viewing the distinction es-
tablished in Buckley for separately analyzing First Amendment chal-
lenges to expenditure limits and contribution limits as one that "lacks
constitutional significance," he would find all contribution limits un-
constitutional.' In effect, Justice Thomas would overrule twenty
years of Supreme Court jurisprudence allowing the Commission to
limit the size of campaign contributions.-"
4. Justice Stevens' dissent
Writing in dissent, and joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Jus-
tice John Paul Stevens argued that the Supreme Court should have
affirmed the Tenth Circuit's decision finding the Party Expenditure
Provision constitutional, both on its face and as applied. 55  Stevens
found that three important government interests were served by the
enforcement of the Party Expenditure Provision's limitations on
spending.' 6 First, Stevens saw the potential for the party to corrupt
its candidate, forcing the candidate to adopt the party's view on any
given public issue due to the party's power to spend (or withhold)
money on the candidate's behalf.5 7 The government's second inter-
Thomas chided Justice Breyer for suggesting that the issue should be avoided because it is
complex, reminding Breyer that "[w)e do not sit to decide only easy cases." Id.
151. See id. at 2325 (stating that Court's failure to determine whether Party Expenditure
Provision is facially unconstitutional will leave parties wondering which expenditures on behalf
of candidates will be protected by First Amendment).
152. See id. ("The validity of [the Party Expenditure Provision]'s controls on coordinated
expenditures is an open question that, if left unanswered, will inhibit the exercise of legitimate
First Amendment activity nationwide.").
153. See id. ("In my view, the distinction [between contribution and expenditure limits]
lacks constitutional significance, and I would not adhere to it."); see also id. at 2327 ("In sum,
unlike the Buckley Court, I believe that contribution limits infringe as directly and as seriously
upon freedom of political expression and association as do expenditure limits.").
154. See id. at 2328 ("I think that the Buckley framework for analyzing the constitutionality of
campaign finance laws is deeply flawed. Accordingly, I would not employ it.").
155. See id. at 2332 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
156. See id.
157. See id. Like Justice Kennedy, Justice Stevens acknowledged the interdependent rela-
tionship between candidates and their parties. See id. Whereas Justice Kennedy sought to pre-
serve or enhance this close relationship, Justice Stevens argued that the government has an in-
terest in minimizing the threat that candidates will feel beholden to the party because of its
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est in regulating political party expenditures, according to Justice
Stevens, was to prevent the circumvention of existing contribution
limits which restrict individuals from giving more than $1000 in a
calendar year to a particular candidate'- or more than $5000 per
year to a party committee. 9 by allowing individuals to funnel contri-
butions to candidates through the party apparatus.' 60 Third, Justice
Stevens found that limiting political party spending served an impor-
tant government interest in holding down the overall costs of cam-
paigns to "level[] the electoral playing field" among candidates for
federal office.''
III. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S RULING
Colorado Republican stands for several important propositions. First,
the Court found that political parties are capable of making inde-
pendent expenditures.'62 Second, the Court held that when political
parties spend money independently on behalf of federal candidates,
such expenditures may not be restricted by the government. ' Fi-
nally, the Court's decision serves to reaffirm its commitment to the
idea that independent expenditures warrant greater First Amend-
ment protection than do contributions.6
Although the Court's decision resolved a number of important
questions, it also raised several others which, if left unanswered, will
create great uncertainty in the minds ofjudges, regulators and politi-
cal officials regarding the enforceability of the Party Expenditure
Provision. Undoubtedly, the most important unanswered question is
whether the prohibition on government restriction of political party
spending applies to coordinated as well as independent expendi-
tures. The Court, arguing that a fuller record must be developed in
order to properly consider this question, remanded the case to the
lower courts. 65 Should the Court ultimately determine, as at least
power to spend. See id.
158. See id. (citing 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a) (1) (A) (1994)).
159. See id. (citing 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a) (1) (C)).
160. See id.
161. Seeid.
162. See FEC Final Rule, 61 Fed. Reg. 40,961 (1996) ("The Court ruled that party commit-
tees are capable of making independent expenditures on behalf of their candidates for Federal
office and that these expenditures are not subject to the coordinated party expenditure limits
[contained in the Party Expenditure Provision].").
163. See id.
164. See Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 116 S. Ct. at 2315 (explaining that contri-
bution limits and expenditure limits have historically been given different First Amendment
treatment by Court).
165. See id. at 2320-21.
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four justices have already concluded," that the First Amendment
protects coordinated expenditures no less than independent expen-
ditures, the Party Expenditure Provision will be stricken.
Assuming, however, that the Court ultimately finds that the gov-
ernment may regulate coordinated spending by political parties, the
Court must explain with greater precision the difference between an
independent expenditure and a coordinated expenditure so that
judges, regulators and the parties may know the boundaries within
which they may operate. In its opinion, the Court indicated that the
Commission must be able to identify evidence of coordination be-
tween the party and the candidate relating to the specific expendi-
ture in question in order to treat the party's spending as a coordi-
nated expenditure. 67 The court failed, however, to specify exactly
what constitutes a coordinated expenditure. As Justice Thomas pre-
dicted in his dissenting opinion,6' the Court's lack of clear guidance
on this matter has left political parties wondering whether and when
they may exercise their newly discovered First Amendment right to
spend money independently on behalf of their federal candidates.'69
In deciding whether to treat a connected expenditure as one cov-
ered by the Party Expenditure Provision, courts also will find that the
Supreme Court's decision in CRFCC provides little guidance on how
to make this determination. The District Court, in its opinion, de-
termined that only coordinated expenditures for communications
that "expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified
candidate" are subject to the Party Expenditure Provision.'" Using a
somewhat broader standard, the Tenth Circuit indicated that all ex-
penditures for communications that "involve a clearly identified can-
didate and an electioneering message" are subject to the Party Ex-
166. See id. at 2323 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (expressing
view, shared by ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, that coordinated party expenditures
should be given same First Amendment protection afforded to expenditures by candidates and
their campaign committees); see also id. (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(stating that he would find that Party Expenditure Provision's limitations on coordinated as
well as independent expenditures fails strict scrutiny).
167. See id. at 2315.
168. See id. at 2325 ("Parties are left to wonder whether their speech is protected by the First
Amendment when the Government can show-presumably with circumstantial evidence-a
link between the Party and the candidate with respect to the speech in question.").
169. Sem Democrats Seek to Foil Republican Spending with FEC Ruling, POL. FIN. & LOBBY REP.,
July 24, 1996, at 1, 3 (explaining that Democratic Party has asked Federal Election Commission
to clarify right given to political parties by Court to spend money independently on behalf of
their federal candidates).
170. See Federal Election Comm'n v. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 839 F.
Supp. 1448, 1453-54 (D. Colo. 1993),rev'd, 59 F.3d 1015 (10th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 2309
(1996).
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penditure Provision.7 Until the Court either declares the Party Ex-
penditure Provision unconstitutional on its face or chooses the ap-
propriate legal standard for determining when a coordinated expen-
diture becomes a Party Expenditure Provision expenditure, judges,
regulators and political parties will be left to wonder which types of
expenditures for communications on behalf of candidates are im-
mune from government restriction.
IV. REACTION TO THE COURT'S RULING
While awaiting the Court's determination concerning the constitu-
tionality of government regulation of political parties' coordinated
spending, both the Commission and the political parties have begun
to interpret for themselves the implications of the Court's ruling. In
response to the Court's decision that political parties are capable of
making independent expenditures, the Commission withdrew its
regulation forbidding parties from spending money independently
on behalf of federal candidates' campaigns.'7 The Commission is
now in the process of writing new regulations concerning the con-
duct it views as constituting coordination for purposes of applying
the Party Expenditure Provision's limitations.'7 3
Initial reaction to the Court's ruling by the two major political par-
ties was split along party lines. The Republican Party, with a decisive
lead over the Democrats in the battle to raise money for the 1996
Senate races, reacted favorably to the Court's conclusion that it could
spend money independently and was looking forward to finding a
way to use the money to help its Senate candidates in the upcoming
elections. ' 74 The Democratic Party's reaction, on the other hand, was
less enthusiastic. 75
Considering the lack of guidance from the Court concerning what
exactly constitutes coordination, the parties find themselves strug-
gling to determine for themselves how they might exercise their
newly clarified spending rights without running afoul of the prohibi-
171. See Federal Election Comm'n v. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 59 F.3d
1015, 1022 (10th Cir. 1995), reuld, 116 S. Ct. 2309 (1996).
172. See FEC Final Rule, 61 Fed. Reg. 40,961 (1996) (deleting 11 C.F.R. § 110.7(b) (4))
(forbidding political parties from making independent expenditures).
173. See FEC Proposed Rule on Independent Expenditures and Party Committee Expendi-
ture Limitations, 62 Fed. Reg. 24,367 (1997) (explaining FEC's proposal to create a new defini-
tion of the term "coordination").
174. See Frank Wolfe, Ruling Could Change How Parties Spend, ARK. DEMOcRAT-GAETrE,June
30, 1996, at BI (citing election commission report showing that as of June, 1996, National Re-
publican Senatorial Committee had amassed $12 million compared to Democratic Senatorial
Campaign Committee's $4 million).
175. See id. ("Reaction from the Democratic National Committee was more subdued.").
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tion on coordination with candidates. 76 One possible approach may
be for the political parties to establish a formal policy of isolating
party employees involved in making independent expenditures from
other party workers who may interact with candidates.'" The parties
await the Commission's opinion regarding whether such a "Chinese
wall" approach would be sufficient to prevent the Commission from
attempting to enforce the Party Expenditure Provision in connection
with this type of arrangement. 78
Although there seems to be no question that the Court's decision
enhanced the stature of political parties compared to other support-
ers of federal candidates, the question still remains whether stronger
parties are beneficial or detrimental to the political system. Those
who argue that stronger parties are necessary to counter-balance the
ever-increasing power of special interest groups 79 view the Court's
ruling as a major step in the right direction.'s Others, who share jus-
tice Stevens's concerns regarding the amount of control that parties
may seek to exercise over candidates' positions on certain issues as a
condition of the party's financial support,' are troubled by the
Court's ruling./81
176. See Democrats Seek to Foil Republican Spending Plans with FEC Advisory Opinion, supra note
169, at 3 (explaining that "the high court's 7-2 plurality decision in [Colorado Republican Fed-
eral Campaign Committee] failed to explain how political parties, which ordinarily maintain
close relationships with their candidates, might make independent expenditures without of-




179. See Geoffrey M. Wardle, Note, Time to Develop a Post-Buckley Approach to Regulating the
Contributions and Expenditures of Political Parties: Federal Election Commission v. Colorado Re-
publican Federal Campaign Committee, 46 CAsE W. RES. L. REV. 603, 626-27 (1996) (arguing
that strengthening political parties may be beneficial); see alsoWolfe, supra note 174, at B1.
180. See Wolfe, supra note 174, at B1 (quoting Haley Barbour, former chairman of Republi-
can National Committee, as saying that "decision guarantees political parties the same free
speech rights other individuals and organizations have enjoyed" meaning that "[n]o longer will
political committees run by big labor bosses have greater freedom of independent expression
in the political debate than the political parties enjoy").
181. See Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 116 S. Ct. at 2332 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(warning that political parties may "abuse the influence it has over the candidate by virtue of its
power to spend"); see also GOP Facing New Abortion Debate; Proposal Bars Aid to Those Opposed to
Ban on 'Partial Birth' Procedure, WASH. POsT, Dec. 30, 1997, at A3 (explaining proposal presently
under consideration by Republican National Committee to "prohibit the party from providing
financial support" to any Republican candidates who oppose restrictions on late-term abor-
tions).
182. See Note, Parties, PACs, and Campaign Finance: Preserving First Amendment Parity, 110
HARV. L. REV. 1573, 1573-74 (1997) (warning that corruption of political process is possible
and may result if Supreme Court ultimately adoptsJustice Kennedy's view of political parties as
unique institutions warranting special First Amendment protection not presently afforded to
political action committees).
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CONCLUSION
Perhaps the most that can be said of the Supreme Court's decision
in Colorado Republican is that it is incomplete. If the Court ultimately
decides that the Party Expenditure Provision is unconstitutional on
its face, then parties will enjoy even greater freedom to spend money
on behalf of federal candidates' campaigns than any other potential
supporters. If, on the other hand, the Court eventually determines
that the government may continue to restrict political parties' coor-
dinated expenditures, further clarification of the constitutionally
relevant differences between independent expenditures, coordinated
expenditures, and connected expenditures is needed in order to
provide guidance to judges, regulators and political parties. Absent
more precise standards by which to evaluate whether particular ex-
penditures are worthy of full First Amendment protection, it may
take years for political parties, the Commission and the courts to ar-
rive at a meaningful consensus concerning the extent to which the
government may restrict party spending made "in connection with"
congressional campaigns.
